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It may be said that as a general rule the belligerent
does not drive out of his jurisdiction subjects of his
opponent. Many treaties specifically provide for their
sojourn. The treaty of the~United States with Italy in
1871 reads as follows :
Art. XXI. If by any fatality which can not be expected, and
which may God avert, the two contracting parties should be en-
gaged in a war with each other, they have agreed, and do agree,
now for then, that there shall be allowed the term of six months
to the merchants residing on the coasts and in the ports of each
other, and the term of one year to those who dwell in the inte-
rior, to arrange their business and transport their effects wher-
ever they please with the safe conduct necessary to protect them
and their property, until they arrive at the ports designated for
their embarkation. And all women and children, scholars of
every faculty, cultivators of the earth, artisans, mechanics, manu-
facturers and fishermen, unarmed and inhabiting the unfortified
towns, villages, or places, and. in general, all others whose occu-
pations are for the common subsistence and benefit of mankind,
shall be allowed to continue their respective employments, and
shall not be molested in their persons, nor shall their houses or
goods be burnt, or otherwise destroyed, nor their fields wasted
by the armed force of the belligerent in whose power, by the
events of war, they may happen to fall ; but if it be necessary
that anything should be taken from them for the use of such
belligerent, the same shall be paid for at a reasonable price.
And it is declared that neither the pretence that war dissolves
treaties, nor any other whatever, shall be considered as annul-
ling or suspending this article ; but on the contrary, that the
state of war is precisely that for which it is provided, and during
which its provisions are to be sacredly observed, as the most
acknowledged obligations in the law of nations.
Later practice as to vessels.—The French declaration of
March 27, 1854, states
:
Abt. I. Six weeks from the present date are granted to Rus-
sian ships of commerce to quit the ports of France. Those Rus-
sian ships which are not actually in our ports, or which may
have left the ports of Russia previously to the declaration of
war, may enter into French ports, and remain there for the com-
pletion of their cargoes, until the 9th of May, inclusive.
The British order in council of March 29, 1854, stated
that
—
Her Majesty, being compelled to declare war against His Im-
perial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and being desirous
to lessen as much as possible the evils thereof, is pleased, by and
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Avith the advice of her Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby
ordered, that Russian merchant vessels, in any j)orts or places
within Her Majesty's dominions, shall be allowed until the 10th
day of May next, six weeks from the date hereof, for loading
their cargoes and departing from such ports or places ; and that
such Russian merchant vessels, if met at sea by any of Her
Majesty's ships, shall be permitted to continue their voyage, if
on examination of their papers it shall appear that their cargoes
were taken on board before the expiration of the above term :
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall extend to or be
taken to extend to Russian vessels having on board any officer in
the military or naval service of the enemy, or any article pro-
hibited or contraband of war, or any dispatch of or to the
Russian Government.
And it is hereby further ordered by Her Majesty, by and with
the advice of her Privy Council as aforesaid, that any Russian
merchant vessel which, prior to the date of this order, shall have
sailed from any foreign port bound for any port or place in Her
Majesty's dominions, shall be permitted to enter such port or
place, and to discharge her cargo, and afterwards forthwith to
depart without molestation, and that any such vessel, if met at
sea by any of Her Majesty's ships, shall be permitted to continue
her voyage to any port not blockaded.
On April 7, 1854, it was ordered that Eussian merchant
vessels then in port should be allowed thirty days in
which to load and depart. Such vessels were not to be
molested at sea provided their papers showed that they
had sailed within the period.
On April 15 it was ordered that this principle should
extend to Russian merchant vessels which, before May 15,
had sailed from a Russian port of the Baltic Sea or White
Sea for a British destination.
Days of grace in Spanish-American %oar.—By Article
II of the Spanish decree of April 23, 1898, .it was stated
that
—
A term of five days from the date of the publication of the
present royal decree in the Madrid Gazette is allowed to all
United States ships anchored in Spanish ports, during which they
are at liberty to depart.
By the President's proclamation of April 25, 1898, war
between the United States and Spain was declared to date
from April 21, 1898, and it was declared that
—
4. Spanish merchant vessels, in anj'- ports or places within the
United States, shall be allowed till May 21, 1898, inclusive, for
18949 4
50 DAYS OF GRACE.
loading their cargoes and departing from such ports or places;
and such Spanish merchant vessels, if met at sea by any United
States ship, shall be permitted to continue their voyage, if, on
examination of their papers, it shall appear that their cargoes
were "taken on board before the expiration of the above term
;
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall apply to Spanish
vessels having on board any officer in the military or naval serv-
ice of the enemy, or any coal (except such as may be necessary
for their voyage), or any other article prohibited or contraband
of war, or any dispatch of or to the Spanish Government.
5. Any Spanish merchant vessel which, prior to April 21, 1898,
shall have sailed from any foreign port bound for any port or
place in the United States, shall be permitted to enter such port
or place, and to discharge her cargo, and afterward forthwith
to depart without molestation ; and any such vessel, if met at
sea by any United States ship, shall be permitted to continue her
voyage to any port not blockaded.
The fourth clause of the above proclamation has re-
ceived full judicial consideration from the Supreme Court
of the United States in the case of the Buena Ventura.
Mr. Justice Peckham, rendering the opinion of the court,
says:
What is included by the words " Spanish merchant vessels in
any ports or places within the United States shall be allowed
until May 21, 1898, inclusive, for loading their cargoes and de-
parting from such ports or places " ? At what time must these
Spanish vessels be "in any ports or places within the United
States" in order to be exempt from capture? The time is not
stated in the proclamation, and therefore the intention of the
Executive as to the time must be inferred. It is a case for con-
struction or interpretation of the language employed.
The language is open to several possible constructions. It
might be said that in describing Spanish merchant vessels in any
ports, etc., it was meant to include only those which were in such
ports on the day when the proclamation was issued, April 26. Or
it might be held (in accordance with the decision of the district
court) to include those that were in such ports on the 21st of
April, the day that war commenced, as Congress declared. Or it
might be construed so as to include not alone those vessels that
were in port on that day, but also those that had sailed there-
from on any day up to and including the 21st of May, the last
day of exemption, and were, when captured, continuing their
voyage, without regard to the particular date of their departure
from port, whether immediately before or subsequently to the
commencement of the war or the issuing of the proclamation. .
The district judge, before whom several cases were tried
together, held that the date of the commencement of the war
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(April 21) was the date intended by the Executive; that as the
proclamation of the 22d of April gave thirty days to neutral ves-
sels found in blockaded ports, it was but reasonable to consider
that the same number of days, commencing' at the outbreak of
the war, should be allowed so as to bring it to the 21st of May,
the day named ; that although a retrospective effect is not usually
given to stautes, yet the question always is, what was the inten-
tion of the legislature?
He also said that "the intention of the Executive was to fully
recognize the recent practice of civilized nations, and not to
sanction or permit the seizure of the vessels of the enemy within
the harbors of the United States at the time of the commence-
ment of the war, or to permit them to escape from ports to be
seized immediately upon entering upon the high seas." (See
preamble to proclamation.)
In the Buena Ventura, the case at bar, the district judge held
that her case " clearly does not come within the language of the
proclamation."
It is true the proclamation did not in so many words pro-
vide that vessels which had loaded in a port of the United States
and sailed therefrom before the commencement of the war should
be entitled to continue their voyage, but we think that those
vessels are clearly within the intention of the proclamation under
the liberal construction we are bound to give to that document.
An intention to include vessels of this class in the exemption
from capture seems to us a necessary consequence of the lan-
guage used in the proclamation when interpreted according to
the known views of this Government on the subject and which
it is to be presumed were the views of the Executive. The
vessel when captured had violated no law, she had sailed from
Ship Island after having obtained written permission, in accord-
ance with the laws of the United States, to proceed to Norfolk
in Virginia, and the permission had been signed by the deputy
collector of the port and the fees therefor paid by the ship. She
had a cargo of lumber, loaded but a short time before the com-
mencement of the war, and she left the port but forty-eight hours
prior to that event. The language of the proclamation cer-
tainly does not preclude the exemption of this vessel, and it is
not an unnatural or forced construction of the fourth clause to
say that it includes this case.
The omission of any date in this clause, upon which the vessel
must be in a port of the United States, and prior to which the
exemption would not be allowed, is certainly very strong evidence
that such a date was not material, so long as the loading and de-
parture from our ports were accomplished before the expiration
of May 21. It is also evident from the language used that the
material concern was to fix a time in the future, prior to the
expiration of which vessels of the character named might sail
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from our ports and be exempt from capture. The particular
time at which the loading- of cargoes and sailing from our ports
should be accomplished was obviously unimportant, provided it
was prior to the time specified. Whether it was before or after
the commencement of the war, would be entirely immaterial.
This seems to us to be the intention of the Executive, derived
from reading the fourth clause with reference to the general
rules of interpretation already spoken of, and we think there is
no language in the proclamation which precludes the giving
effect to such intention. Its purpose was to protect innocent
merchantmen of the enemy who had been trading in our ports
from capture, provided they sailed from such ports before a cer-
tain named time in the future, and that purpose would be wholly
unaffected b}r the fact of a sailing prior to the war. That fact
was immaterial to the scheme of the proclamation, gathered
from all its language.
We do not assert that the clause would apply to a vessel
which had left a port of the United States prior to the commence-
ment of the war and had arrived at a foreign port and there dis-
charged her cargo, and had then left for another foreign port prior
to May 21. The instructions to United States ships, contained in
the fourth clause, to permit the vessels "to continue their voyage'*
would limit the operation of the clause to those vessels that were
still on their original voyage from the United States, and had
taken on board their cargo (if any they had) at a port of the
United States before the expiration of the term mentioned. The
exemption would probably not apply to such a case as The PJirriiix
(Spink's Prize Cases, 1). That case arose out of the English
order in council, made at the commencement of the Crimean war.
The vessel had sailed from an English port in the middle of
February, 1854, with a cargo, bound for Copenhagen, and having
reached that port and discharged her cargo by the middle of
March, she had sailed therefrom on the 10th of April, bound to a
foreign port, and wras captured on the 12th of April while pro-
ceeding on such voyage. The order in council was dated the
29th of March, 1854, and provided that "Russian merchant vessels,
in any ports or places within Her Majesty's dominions, shall be
allowed until the tenth day of May next, six weeks from the date
hereof, for loading their cargoes and departing from such ports
or places," etc. The claim of exemption was made on the ground
that the vessel had been in an English port, and although she
sailed therefrom in the middle of February to Copenhagen and
had there discharged her cargo, before the order in council was
promulgated, yet it was still urged that she was entitled to ex-
emption from capture. The court held the claim was not well
founded, and that it could not by any latitude of construction
hold a vessel to have been in an English port on the 29th of
March, which on that day was lying in the port of Copenhagen,
having at that time discharged the cargo which she had taken
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from the English port. It is true the court took the view that
the vessel must at all events have been in an English port on the
29th of March in order to obtain exemption, and if not there on
that day, the vessel did not come within the terms of the order and
was not exempt from capture. From the language of the opinion
in that case it would seem not only that a vessel dej^arting the
day before the 29th of March would not come within the ex-
emption, but that a vessel arriving the day after the 29th, and
departing before the 10th of May following, would also fail to do
so ; that the vessel must have been in an English port on the
very day named, and if it departed the day before or arrived
the day after, it was not covered by the order.
The French Government also, on the outbreak of the Crimean
war, decreed a delay of six weeks, beginning on the date of the
decree, to Russian merchant vessels in which to leave French
ports. Russia issued the same kind of a decree, and other
nations have at times made the same provisions. It is claimed
that they confine the exemption to vessels that are actually
within the ports of the nation at the date of issuing the decree
or order.
We are not inclined to put so narrow a construction upon the
language used in this proclamation. The interpretation which
we have given to it, while it may be more liberal than the other,
is still one which may properly be indulged in.
If this vessel, instead of sailing on the 19th, had not sailed
until the 21st of April, the court below says she would have been
exempt from capture. In truth, she was from her character and
her actual employment just as much the subject of liberal treat-
ment, and was as equitably entitled to an exemption when sailing
on the 19th, as she would have been had she waited until the 21st.
No fact had occurred since her sailing which altered her case in
principle from the case of a vessel which had been in port on,
though sailing after, the 21st. To attribute an intention on the
part of the Executive to exempt a vessel if she sailed on or after
the 21st of April, and before the 21st of May, and to refuse such
exemption to a vessel in precisely the same situation, only sailing*
before the 21st, would as we think, be without reasonable justi-
fication. It may safely be affirmed that he never had any such
distinction in mind and never intended it to exist. There is
nothing in the nature of the two cases calling for a difference
in their treatment. They both alike called for precisely the same
rule, and if there be language in the clause or proclamation from
which an inference can be drawn favorable to the exemption, and
none which precludes it, we are bound to hold that the exception
is given. We think the language of the proclamation does per-
mit the inference and that there is none which precludes it.
We are aware of no a'd judications of our own court as to the
meaning to be given to words similar to those contained in the
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proclamation, and it may be that a step in advance is now taken
upon this subject. Where, however, the words are reasonably-
capable of an interpretation which shall include a vessel of this
description in the exemption from capture, we are not averse to
adopting- it, even though this court may be the first to do so.
If the Executive should hereafter be inclined to take the other
view, the language of his proclamation could be so altered as to
leave no doubt of that intention, and it would be the duty of this
court to be guided and controlled by it. (175 U. S. Supreme
Court Eeports, 384.)
Days of grace in Russo-Japanese war.—The wars of
the latter half of the nineteenth century were in the main
land wars. In such Avars the rights of neutrals being ordi-
narily little involved, tended to become established. Mari-
time rights also tended to become fixed and liberal and
assimilated to land rights. In the Spanish-American and
in the South African wars, neutrals were not much
involved nor were maritime rights largely involved. The
Russo-Japanese war of 1904—5, however, being to a con-
siderable extent a naval war, has brought questions of
neutral and maritime rights into prominence. Much
more deliberation and forbearance has been shown by all
parties in dealing with questions raised during the Russo-
Japanese wqr, because the states involved as neutrals are
states having and relying on naval power. These states
therefore realize that positions which they may assume
in the early days of the twentieth century may later be
quoted against them. There has consequently been a
tendency to look with tolerance on the extension of bel-
ligerent activities.
The Japanese ordinance relating to the exemption of
Russian merchant vessels from seizure was published
February 9. It provided
—
Aet. 1. Russian merchant ships which happen to be moored in
any Japanese port at the time of the issue of the present rules
may discharge or load their cargo and leave the country not later
than February 16.
Aet. II. Russian merchant ships which have left Japan in ac-
cordance with the foregoing article and which are provided with
a special certificate from the Japanese authorities shall not be
captured if they can prove that they are steaming back direct to
the nearest Russian port, or a leased port, or to their original
destination ; this measure shall, however, not apply in case such
a.
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the days of grace down to a minimum, is almost certain to do
especially if its own sea-borne commerce is so small that little is
to be feared from retaliatory measures. But, quite apart from
purely mercantile considerations, we must reckon here, as in
many other questions, with the changed conditions of modern
warfare. If a sea-going fleet is to be effective for long together,
it must be followed by a train of colliers, supply ships, repairing
vessels, and hosts of others, carrying all the numerous require-
ments of a navy which is a mass of complicated machinery, and
is afflicted with an insatiable hunger for coal. If, on a sudden
outbreak of war, a belligerent finds his ports full of merchant-
men belonging to enemy owners, and well adapted for the pur-
poses I have described, he may capture them all, dispensing with
days of grace entirely, and taking full advantage of the oppor-
tunity which fortune has placed in his hands. In such a case it
would be curious to see whether the desire to injure the enemy
would prevail over the fear of offending neutrals, by causing a
great dislocation of trade in which some of them are sure to be
interested. Certainly it will be wise for British shipowners to
read the signs of the times, and not calculate upon a continuance
in future of the indulgences which have been accorded in recent
years on the outbreak of hostilities to the merchantmen of the
belligerent states. There is one class of vessel against which the
full rights of war will almost certainly be exercised. I refer to
swift liners, built on designs which make them easily adaptable
for warlike purposes, and liable to be taken over by their govern-
ments in the event of hostilities. It would be criminal folly for|
a state to permit the departure of any such ships of enemy*
nationality which happened to be in its ports at the outbreak of \
a great war. (War and Neutrality in the Far East, 2d ed., p. 53.)
Treatment of vessels adapted for use in war.—One of
the most difficult questions in the conduct of maritime
warfare in modern times is the determination of the
method of treatment of vessels which though in time of
peace are commercial vessels, yet in time of war are easily
converted into vessels of war. If such vessels are in or
come into port of one of the belligerents and belong to
the other belligerent it is hardly reasonable to expect that
they will be allowed freely to depart to augment the
military forces of the other belligerent. It is very diffi-
cult to draw the line between vessels which may and
which may not be converted to usefulness in war. Fast
steamers may be of service as scouts even though not
fitted for carrying heavy guns, slow steamers of large
capacity may be of service as colliers, indeed at the present
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Russian merchant ships have once touched at a Russian port or
a leased port.
Art. III. Russian steamers which may have left for a Japanese
port before February f£ may enter our ports, discharge their
cargo at once, and leave the country. The Russian steamers
coming under the above category shall be treated in accordance
with Article II.
Ai:t. IV. Russian steamers carrying contraband of war of any
kind whatever shall lie excluded from the above rules.
Thus Japan allowed[seven days of grace.
On February 14. 1904, the Russian Government issued
fhe following rules:
I. Japanese subjects are allowed to continue, under the pro-
ection of the Russian laws, their sojourn and the exercise of
peaceful occupations in the Russian Empire excepting in the ter-
ritories which are under the control of the imperial vicero3r in the
Far East.
II. Japanese trading vessels which were in Russian ports or
havens at the time of the declaration of the war are authorized
to remain at such ports before putting out to sea with goods
which do not constitute articles of contraband during the delay
required in proportion to the cargo of the vessel, but which in any
case must not exceed forty-eight hours from the time of the
publication of the present declaration by the local authorities.
Thus a limit of time not to exceed forty-eight hours
from the publication of the imperial order was allowed.
Speaking of the days of grace allowed by Russia and
Japan in 1004. Professor Lawrence say.-
:
The sea-borne trade of Russia in the northern Pacific is not
large in extent or enormous in value. She can afford to see it
suffer with equanimity. Japan, on the other hand, has much to
lose. Of late the increase of her mercantile marine has been as
remarkable as the growth of her fighting navy. She has taken
over a large number of its best vessels to act as transports. It
is impossible to exaggerate the value of such service to a state
which must attack its foe with armies sent across the seas.
Perhaps it was the consciousness of this which caused Russia to
cut down her days of grace to a minimum. The incident should
be a warning to us of what we may expect if we should be en-
gaged in war with a maritime power. In this matter, when bel-
ligerents are bound by no definite rules of universal acceptance,
they will naturally consult their own interests, though we may
hope that cases will sometimes occur in which other considera-
tions will be present to their minds. A power which sees a
chance of striking a severe blow at its enemy's trade by cutting
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time nearly all vessels aside from sailing vessels are easily
converted to some war use. A belligerent having or re-
ceiving in its ports such vessels of the opponent would
be using only reasonable precaution in making sure that
they should not go forth to his injury. Still more neces-
sary would it be to provide for cases of vessels subsidized
or otherwise wholly or partly controlled bv the enemy's
government. That such vessels are liable to treatment
as war vessels is shown in the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1900 in the case of the
Panemia. The resume of the case as given by the court
is as follow^
:
The Panama was a .steamship of 1.432 tons register, carrying a
crew of 71 men all told, owned by a Spanish corporation, sailing
under the Spanish flag, having a commission as a royal mail ship
from the Government of Spain, and plying from and to Xew York
and Havana and various Mexican ports, with general cargoes,
passengers, and mails. At the time of her capture, she was on a
voyage from Xew York to Havana, and had on board two breech-
loading Hontoria guns of 9-centimeter bore, one mounted on each
side of the ship, one Maxim rapid-firing gun on the bridge, 20
Eemington rifles and 10 Mauser rifles, with ammunition for all
the guns and rifles, and 30 or 10 cutlasses. The guns had been
put on board three years before, and the small arms and ammuni-
tion had been on board a year or more. Her whole armament
had been put on board by the company in compliance with its
mail contract with the Spanish Government (made more than
eleven years before and still in force), which specifically re-
quired every mail steamship of the company to " take on board,
for her own defense." such an armament, with the exception of
the Maxim gun and the Mauser rifles.
That contract contains many provisions looking to the use of
the company's steamships by the Spanish Government as vessels
of war. Among other things, it requires that each vessel shall
have the capacity to carry 500 enlisted men ; that that Govern-
ment, upon inspection of her plans as prepared for commercial
and postal purposes, may order her deck and sides to be strength-
ened so as to support additional artillery: and that, in case of
the suspension of the mail service by a naval war, or by hostilities
in any of the seas or ports visited by the company's vessels, the
Government may take possession of them with their equipment
and supplies, at a valuation to be made by a commission ; and
shall, at the termination of the war return them to the com-
pany, paying 5 per cent on the valuation while it has them in
its service, as well as an indemnity for any diminution in their
value.
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The Panama was not a neutral vessel, but she was enemy
property, and as such, even if she carried no arms (either as part
of her equipment or as cargo), would be liable to capture, unless
protected by the President's proclamation.
It may be assumed that a primary object of her armament,
and, in time of peace, its only object, was for purposes of de-
fense. But that armament was not of itself inconsiderable, as
appears, not only from the undisputed facts of the case, but from
the action of the district court, upon the application of the com-
modore commanding at the port where the court was held, and
on the recommendation of the prize commissioners, directing her
arms and ammunition to be delivered to the commodore for the
use of the Navy Department. And the contract of her owner
with the Spanish Government, pursuant to which the armament
had been put on board, expressly provided that,* in case of war,
that Government might take possession of the vessel with her
equipment, increase her armament, and use her as a war vessel
;
and, in these and other provisions, evidently contemplated her use
for hostile purposes in time of war.
She was, then, enemy property, bound for an enemy port, car-
rying an armament susceptible of use for hostile purposes, and
herself liable, upon arrival in that port, to be appropriated by
the enemy to such purposes.
The intent of the fourth clause of the President's proclamation
was to exempt for a time from capture peaceful commercial ves-
sels ; not to assist the enemy in obtaining weapons of war. This
clause exempts "Spanish merchant vessels" only ; and expressly
declares that it shall not apply to " Spanish vessels having on
board any officer in the military or naval service of the enemy,
or any coal (except such as may be necessary for their voyage)
or any other article prohibited or contraband of war, or any dis-
patch of or to the Spanish Government."
Upon full consideration of this case, this court is of opinion
that the proclamation, expressly declaring that the exemption
shall not apply to any Spanish vessel having on board any article
prohibited or contraband of war, or a single military or naval
officer, or even a dispatch, of the enemy, can not reasonably be
construed as including, in the description of "Spanish merchant
vessels" which are to be temporarily exempt from capture, a
Spanish vessel owned by a subject of the enemy ; having an arma-
ment fit for hostile use ; intended, in the event of war, to be used
as a war vessel ; destined to a port of the enemy; and liable, on
arriving there, to be taken possession of by the enemy, and em-
ployed as an auxiliary cruiser of the enemy's navy, in the war
with this country.
The result is, that the Panama was lawfully captured and con-
demned, and that the decree of the district court must be affirmed.
(176 U. S. Supreme Court Eeports, 535.)
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From the decision of the court it is evident that vessels
liable to be employed as auxiliary cruisers and under con-
tract with the enemy government are liable to treatment
as war vessels . The presence of a contract may not, how- i^^x/
ever, materially alter the actual results, as a vessel of such
character as may be readily converted into a vessel of use
in war may on arriving in its own country be appropriated
by its government for such use. If such vessels of one bel-
ligerent are to be allowed to leave the ports of the other
there must be therefore some agreement which shall be
binding on the two belligerents under which they shall be
allowed to leave. The essential part of such agreement
would be that they should not be used for warlike pur-
poses if allowed to depart. The aim of the regulation is
not to interfere with commerce but to prevent the increase
of the war resources of the enemy, thus giving to com-
merce greater freedom without introducing complications
consequent upon the possession of a doubtful character by
the vessel.
Lieutenant Bellairs, writing from a British point of
view, in August, 1905, says of Great Britain
:
In any case, she has considerable reasons for extending the
period of grace for merchant vessels after the declaration of
war, as was done by the United States in the war with Spain.
A special exception would have to be made in the case of enemy's
vessels suitable for war purposes as mercantile cruisers. A good
example is not enough, for neither Russia nor Japan has followed
the United States in the present war. There is no reason under
international law at present why British vessels on the sea, or in
her opponent's ports when war breaks out, should obtain any
days of grace whatever. The contention might be advanced that
every vessel is suitable for collier, transport, or some form of
auxiliary for war purposes. (181 North American Review, p.
170.)
Rule of Institute of International Law—At the session
of the Institute of International Law in 1898 the follow-
ing rule was adopted
:
Art. 40. Les navires de commerce qui, au debut des hostilites
ou hors de la declaration de guerre, se trouvent dans un port en-
nemi, ne sont pas sujets a saisie, dans le delai determine par les
autorites. Pendant ce delai ils peuvent y decharger leur car-
gaison et en prendre une autre. (Annuaire, 1898, p. 284.)
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Conditions modifying restrictions.—Certain proclama-
tions have allowed longer or shorter periods to the enemy
merchant vessels according as they sailed from remote
or from neighboring ports. Sometimes allowance has
been made according to the character of the vessel, a
longer time for sailing vessels and a shorter time for
steam vessels.
At the present time it is evident that the object of war
is not the destruction of private property on land or sea.
The restriction of the movements of commerce particu-
larly to and from its own ports may be a greater damage
to a belligerent thus acting than to the opposing bellig-
erent. There seems to be no sufficient reason why the
innocent trade between states that may possibly be at war
should be destroyed a long time before war actually exists
simply because merchants anticipate seizure of vessels
immediately on the outbreak of hostilities. It would seem
better for both belligerents that the effects of the war
should so far as possible be confined to the period of the
war. In order that this may be accomplished there must
be reasonable assurance that vessels sailing on commer-
cial undertakings before the outbreak of war will be
allowed to complete their undertakings so far as these do
not interfere with the conduct of the war. It would not
be reasonable to demand that a vessel be permitted to sail
with a permit to enter a blockaded port merely because
the original plan of the voyage had contemplated such a
course. It would not be necessary to allow a vessel to
load with contraband because this had been the cargo
which she had originally planned to take. It would not
be necessary to allow a sojourn of a period which the
vessel had originally in the schedule of its voyage. Rea-
sonable treatment of such character as would not affect
the conduct of the hostilities should be accorded. Such a
course seems to be in harmony with recent practice. It
can safely be said that ordinaiw merchant vessels of one
belligerent in the port of the other belligerent at the out-
break of war should be allowed time to load and depart.
Vessels of one belligerent bound for or within the ports
of the other belligerent may be of different classes.
•"
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Public vessels adapted for warlike purposes would
hardly be allowed to leave port. Of course such vessels!
would rarely be in an enemy port at the outbreak of war.
Public vessels engaged in purely philanthropic or scien-
tific undertakings would be permitted to depart. Such L^
vessels would include hospital ships and ships engaged in
exploration.
It is now becoming very difficult to determine exactly P
what constitutes a merchant vessel, but if there is satis-
factory evidence that a private vessel of a belligerent is
a merchant vessel then she should be allowed the fullest
freedom consistent with military expediency. Many rea-
sons might make it necessary to delay or altogether pre-
vent the departure of such a vessel, e. g., if the vessel were
in a port used as a base of military operations which it
was deemed necessary to keep secret, or if the merchant-
man might naturally be supposed to have obtained mili-
tary information which should not be disclosed to the
enemy, even though no guilt might attach to the mer-
chantman.
The movement of yachts, pleasure vessels, and other
new forms of transportation may need to be regulated as
well as those of merchant vessels. It is therefore neces-
sary that the regulations be more general than heretofore
and be made to apply to private vessels in distinction
from public vessels; yachts and pleasure vessels ordi-
narily need little time for loading necessary supplies and
departure. The sojourn of such vessels may have all the
consequences of the sojourn of a merchant vessel.
It seems to be evident that it might be necessary or
expedient to deny the right to depart to certain vessels,
possibly to seize and hold some, and to regulate the move-
ments of all, because even though a hospital ship might
be innocent in character its crew might possess such
knowledge of a belligerent's plans as to make it necessary
to detain the ship for a time.
Summary.—From the above discussion it would seem
proper to draw certain conclusions in regard to the treat-
ment of vessels of one belligerent bound for or within the
port of the other belligerent.
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(a) Under supervision of government exercising juris-
diction over the port, a reasonable and limited period
should be allowed for innocent enemy vessels to depart.
(b) This period will vary according as the government
may deem expedient.
(c) The period should be determined by the govern-
ment giving due consideration to the rights of commerce
and to military necessities.
(d) Vessels which are by nature closely connected with
the military service of the other belligerent may be de-
tained or seized.
(e) Vessels of a character easily converted into vessels
of use in war may be detained or placed under guarantee
not to enter military service.
The regulations which would bring about the proper
practice in regard to the days of grace allowed to vessels
of one belligerent bound for or within the port of the
other belligerent at the outbreak of war apparently can
not fix a definite number of days because of the varying
conditions under which war may arise and the uncertainty
which frequently prevails as to the date of its commence-
ment. The government having jurisdiction over the port
alone can establish the regulations for its use. Not all
classes of vessels are entitled to the same exemptions from
capture on the high seas or to the same exemptions in
the ports of the other belligerent. Some period should be
allowed for innocent belligerent vessels to load and depart
from opponent's ports after war has begun. There should
be an international agreement upon the principles in ac-
cord Avith which governments should act, as there has been
so great diversity in practice hitherto that the burden of
Avar has been made unnecessarily heavy in many instances.
The burden thus placed on commerce does not affect bel-
ligerents alone, but in case of Avar between two or more
great poAAers aa-ouIcI rest upon other states not parties to
the contest, Avhich is manifestly unjust and leads to
unfortunate complications and sometimes to attempts to
make up by burdensome measures for losses sustained.
The time allowed for loading and departure of a private
vessel.of one belligerent in the port of the other belligerent
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at the outbreak of war has varied greatly according to
circumstances. Six weeks were allowed in certain cases
in the Crimean war. Thirty days were allowed by the
United States in the Spanish-American war and five
days by Spain. In the Russo-Japanese war, Russia al-
lowed forty-eight hours from the local publication of the
' V_ Russian decree ; Japan allowed seven days from February
,_ 9, 1901. v It seems to be evident that there is no uniform
practice in regard to the period to be allowed. Further,
the conditions and circumstances of different wars are so
varied that any period which might be fixed for all
wars would be too long in case of certain wars and too
short in case of others. New methods and means of war-
fare would need consideration from time to time, as would
also new developments in commerce. It would therefore
seem impossible to fix upon any exact period which should
be allowed in all cases.
One state may regard it as of advantage to itself to
allow a short period for loading and departure even after
another state has allowed a longer period. The state
allowing the longer period should be permitted to take
such action as would not make its liberality a cause of
injury to itself. Accordingly it must be permitted to
reduce the period to that of the other belligerent.
There are in addition to merchant vessels many other
innocent vessels which are not merchant vessels which
may belong to one belligerent and be in the ports of the
other at the outbreak of war. Such a vessel as a private
yacht is of this class. It may be as necessary to regulate
the sojourn and general conduct of a yacht as of a mer-
chant vessel. The regulation therefore should be general
to apply to all innocent private vessels.
There may be special military reasons making it im-
portant that vessels in a belligerent port shall not have
unlimited freedom. It would not be reasonable to expect
that in time of war the freedom in all respects wTould not
be much more restricted than in time of peace. Certain
ports from military reasons may be closed or enemy ves-
sels may be sent out if deemed expedient. The course in
such matters must be left to each state to determine.
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Many private vessels may easily be adapted for use in
war. It would hardly seem reasonable to allow such a
vessel to return to a home port where it might be seized
or turned over for war use. Such a vessel belonging to
one belligerent and being within the jurisdiction of the
other is liable to such reasonable treatment as the bel-
ligerent having authority over the vessel may determine,
provided it is not contrary to the principles of interna-
tional law. Certainly such a vessel should not be alloAved
to depart to strengthen the war resources of the enemy.
It would be reasonable to detain such a vessel if its inno-
cent use could not be guaranteed.
As it is not the purpose to interfere with commerce but
merely to guard against the increase of the war resources
of the enemy, it would be sufficient to bring about an
agreement which would guarantee the belligerent in whose
ports the vessel may be against any war use of the vessel
if it should be allowed to depart. A guaranty of this
kind would not interfere with commerce and would give
to the belligerent desirous of extending liberal treatment
to his opponent security against the abuse of his liberality.
To bring about fair treatment of merchant vessels of
one belligerent by the authorities of the other belligerent
and at the same time to prevent the use of such vessels
for hostile purposes the following regulations are sug-
gested :
Conclusion.—1. Each state entering upon a war shall
announce a date before which enemy vessels bound for or
within its ports at the outbreak of war shall under ordi-
nary conditions be allowed to enter, to discharge cargo,
to load cargo and to depart, without liability to capture
while sailing directly to a permitted destination. If one
belligerent state allows a shorter period than the other,
the other state may, as a matter of right, reduce its period
to correspond therewith.
2. Each belligerent state may make such regulations in
regard to sojourn, conduct, cargo, destination, and move-
ments after departure of the innocent enemy vessels as
may be deemed necessary to protect its military interests.
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3. A private vessel suitable for warlike use, belonging
to one belligerent and bound for or within ports of the
other belligerent at the outbreak of war, is liable to be
detained unless the government of the vessel's flag makes
a satisfactory agreement that it shall not be put to any
warlike use, in which case it may be accorded the same
treatment as innocent enemy vessels.
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